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THE CASE AGAINST THE SWEDISH TRANSMISSION 
SYSTEM OPERATOR (TSO) SVENSKA KRAFTNAT 




The case initiated against Swedish transmission system operator Svenska Kraftnät by 
the Danish company Dansk Energy before European Commission is demonstrating 
the position according to which a fact that the undertaking has a great market power 
and a dominant position does not automatically by itself represent a violation of 
competition rules: However, according to a regulator and the court practice such an 
undertaking should have a special responsibility. The European Commission opened 
proceedings against SvK primarily due to suspected abuse of a dominant position of 
the company SvK, given its monopoly as the exclusive operator of the Swedish elec-
tricity transmission network, by limiting the transmission capacity between Swedish 
interconnectors and interconnectors of neighboring countries and thus preventing 
proper functioning of the internal electricity market.
It is to be considered that the ability to prevent the maintenance or development of 
competition is refl ected when an undertaking with a dominant position has the ability 
to signifi cantly close the access to the market to other undertakings, or the ability to 
determine the conditions under which it will develop market competition with com-
petitors in horizontal market position. This case is providing with examples of typical 
forms of closing of the related markets by performance of the related business, rejec-
tion of business operations and deny of access to “necessary means”. 
*  Partner at Law Firm Mamić, Perić, Reberski , Rimac LLC; n.peric@mprr.hr.
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1. INTRODUCTION
 This paper provides analyze of the procedure initiated on July 20th 2006 be-
fore the European Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “Commission”) 
by Dansk Energi, trade and professional association of companies engaged in 
energy activities in Denmark (hereinafter referred to as “DaE”) against the 
company Svenska Kraftnät commissioned to maintain, operate and develop 
the national transmission grid for electric power (hereinafter referred to as 
“SvK”) regarding the abuse of a dominant position. 1
The institution of a dominant position2 in the competition law of the European 
Union is not regulated by specifi c provision, but is defi ned through the practice 
of the European Court3. Since the provisions on abuse of a dominant position 
are prior to those relating to the control of concentration (Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty, in force since 1958), the Court’s defi nition of a dominant position is given 
in the context of the assessment of abuse of a dominant position. Nevertheless, it 
can be applied in the context of Article 82 and in the context of the application 
of rules for assessment of the concentration of undertakings. European Court 
rejected Commission’s suggestion to differ the institute of dominant position on 
the basis of the Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertak-
ings from the institute of dominant position related to abuse.4
According to the case-law, an undertaking is in a dominant position5, if it has 
the ability to behave independently of its competitors, customers, suppliers 
1  The concept of a dominant position was defi ned in the case of the European Court United 
Brans v Commission of the European Communities, C-27/76 [1978] ECR 207.: „The dominant 
position to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to pre-
vent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of 
its consumers“
2  See more about dominant position in Sabolic D.: Tržišno natjecanje i regulacija u sektori-
ma električne energije i elektroničkih komunikacija. Priručnik za studente na kolegiju Pravo 
konkurencije (Market competition and regulation in the electricity and electronic communica-
tions sector. Handbook for students at the Competition Law course) Faculty of Economics in 
Zagreb, 2015, Zagreb.
3  See more about the development of EU competition law in Monti G. EU Competition Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007.
4  Pecotić Kaufman J., Nadzor koncentracija poduzetnika u pravu tržišnog natjecanja Eu-
ropske unije – pet godina nakon reforme (Control of concentration of undertakings in the 
competition law of the European Union - fi ve years after the reform), Pravo i porezi (Law and 
taxes), October 2009; RRIF, Zagreb, 2009.
5  See more in Šoljan V.; Vladajući položaj na tržištu i njegova zlouporaba u pravu tržišnog 
natjecanja Europske zajednice (Abuse of Dominant Position on the Market in the European 
Community Competition Law) Ibis grafi ka d.o.o. Zagreb, 2004.
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and, ultimately, the fi nal consumer6. Such position means that the undertaking 
can increase prices without being adversely affected. If an undertaking did 
not have such a position, competition and market conditions would result in 
decreasing his market share due to the increased prices and would thus reduce 
its profi tability.
This paper shall provide analyze the manner in which the Commission has 
applied the competition rules in order to encourage the integration of the Nor-
dic countries in the energy sector. This paper ignores the political debate re-
lated to this case that was led in the Nordic countries7.
2.  CASE SVENSKA KRAFTNAT (C-39351)
2.1.  GROUNDS FOR THE SUBMISSION OF COMPLAINTS TO THE 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
DaE emphasized in its complaint that SvK has a policy of limiting transmis-
sion capacity through the interconnectors (transmission capacity between elec-
tric power systems of neighboring countries) through the Öresund intercon-
nector between southern Sweden and eastern Denmark. DaE also stated in its 
complaint that SvK has a policy of limiting transmission capacity through the 
Öresund interconnector not for reasons of securing supply of electricity but for 
reasons of lowering costs connected to counter-trade and also in order to lower 
the spot market price in Sweden.
Further, DaE alleged that such policy of limiting transmission capacity by SvK 
has a damaging effect on competition and trade within the internal market of 
the European Union8, and especially to the detriment of consumers in eastern 
Denmark. DaE, as an association of energy companies in Denmark also al-
leged that DaE is directly concerned by such a policy of SvK which by using 
its market position9 and by limiting transmission capacity through the inter-
6  See more in Commission notice on the defi nition of the relevant market for the purposes 
of Community competition law, OJ C 372, 9.12.1997, p. 5–13.
7  See more in Sadowska M., Willems B: Power Markets Shaped by Antitrust, Tilec Discus-
sion Paper Vol 2012-043, 2012, Tilburg.
8  See more about the internal market of EU in Bodiroga-Vukobrat, N., Horak, H., Marti-
nović, A.: Temeljne gospodarske slobode u Europskoj uniji, Inženjerski biro (Fundamental 
economic freedoms in the European Union), Inženjerski biro, Zagreb, 2011.
9  See more about the method of determining the market power in Sabolic D.: Tržišno nat-
jecanje i regulacija u sektorima električne energije i elektroničkih komunikacija. Priručnik za 
studente na kolegiju Pravo konkurencije, Ekonomski fakultet u Zagrebu (Market competition 
and regulation in the electricity and electronic communications sector. Handbook for students 
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connectors caused a limited electricity export in Denmark, infl ation of prices 
in eastern Denmark, restricting effective competition and fi nally harming of 
consumers in the area. 
Accordingly, DaE requested that the Commission initiates proceedings 
against SvK under Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 
of the European Commission Treaty (hereinafter referred to as “Regulation 
1/2003”)10 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 
relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Arti-
cles 81 and 82 of the European Commission Treaty (hereinafter referred to as 
“Regulation 773/2004”)11 for an abuse of dominant position.
After the above complaints, the Commission used its investigative powers of 
Chapter V of Regulation 1/2003 and also expanded the scope of its investi-
gation to the overall conduct of SvK regarding the interconnectors to all the 
Swedish borders, not just on the border with Denmark12.
at the Competition Law course, Faculty of Economics in Zagreb), 2015, Zagreb,: “Although the 
concept of market power is the easiest to illustrate using the indicators of the relative difference 
between the sale price and marginal costs, such as the Lerner index, such a description is not 
entirely appropriate, since the price captures only the behavior of the undertaking towards 
its customers. Another aspect that is important in describing the market power is conduct of 
the undertaking towards its competitors on the market. It is probably not possible to defi ne a 
particularly convenient synthetic indicator there. The point is, however, that the undertaking 
for which we can say that it enjoys a position of market power has the ability to arbitrarily and 
strategically impact competitors and the market as a whole. This infl uence does not have to 
be absolute. However, the market power of the undertaking increases as the undertaking gets 
more independent in its strategic moves. The term strategic impact includes measures of busi-
ness policy that management of the undertaking implements to lead the undertaking to a better 
market position in the long term than its competitors, and subsequently, to lead its competitors 
to inferior market position.”
10  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (Offi cial Journal L 001/1 from 16 December 2002).
11  Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of pro-
ceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty establishing the 
European Community Offi cial Journal L 123 from 27 April 2004)
12  See more about conduct and operation of SvK in Sadowska M., Willems B: Power Markets 
Shaped by Antitrust, Tilec Discussion Paper Vol 2012-043, 2012, Tilburg.
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2.2. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
The Commission opened the formal process for potential violation of the 
European Union law regarding the prohibition of abuse of dominant posi-
tion13 against the company SvK, commissioned to maintain, operate and de-
velop the national transmission grid for electric power, which includes all 
the interconnectors with neighboring countries owned by the Kingdom of 
Sweden (interconnectors between the Kingdom of Sweden and Germany are 
not owned by Sweden, however SvK as the owner of the transmission grid 
in Sweden can infl uence and thereby reduce the available capacity for this 
interconnector as well). 14
The Commission opened the respective proceedings to make a decision based 
on Chapter III. Regulation 1/2003, which regulates Commissions decisions 
in relation to the establishment and elimination of violations of the current 
Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(hereinafter referred to as “TFEU”).15.
Both cited articles are part of the chapter of the TFEU which incorporates 
competition rules applicable to undertakings. In this regard, Article 101 TFEU 
prohibits agreements between undertakings which are not in compliance with 
the internal market, i.e. those that may affect trade between Member States 
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion 
of competition within the internal market16.
13  See more in Šoljan V.; Vladajući položaj na tržištu i njegova zlouporaba u pravu tržišnog 
natjecanja Europske zajednice (Abuse of Dominant Position on the Market in the European 
Community Competition Law); Ibis grafi ka d.o.o. Zagreb, 2004.
14  See more about the fundamental economic freedoms in Bodiroga-Vukobrat, N., Horak, 
H., Martinović, A.: Temeljne gospodarske slobode u Europskoj uniji (Fundamental economic 
freedoms in the European Union), Inženjerski biro, Zagreb, 2011.
15  Treaty on the functioning of the European Union published in the Offi cial Journal of the 
European Union C 202, of 7 June 2016.
16  Article 101.TFEU (ex-Article 81 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(TEC)):  “1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in 
particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fi x purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
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Article 102 TFEU prohibits any abuse of a dominant position by one or more 
undertakings within the internal market or in a substantial part of it as in-
compatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between 
Member States. 1718.
The Commission opened these proceedings against SvK primarily due to sus-
pected abuse of a dominant position of the company SvK, given its monopoly 
as the exclusive operator of the Swedish electricity transmission network, by 
limiting the transmission capacity between Swedish interconnectors and inter-
connectors of neighboring countries and thus preventing proper functioning of 
the internal electricity market.
The Commission considered that the above stated conduct of SvK may put 
consumers in Sweden in a more favorable position than consumers in coun-
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplemen-
tary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection 
with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings,
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings,
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting tech-
nical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefi t, and 
which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the at-
tainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substan-
tial part of the products in question.”
17  See more about the abuse of the market competition in Šoljan V.; Vladajući položaj na 
tržištu i njegova zlouporaba u pravu tržišnog natjecanja Europske zajednice (Abuse of Domi-
nant Position on the Market in the European Community Competition Law); Ibis grafi ka d.o.o. 
Zagreb, 2004.
18  Article 102. TFEU (ex-Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(TEC)) glasi: Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the in-
ternal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading con-
ditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplemen-
tary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection 
with the subject of such contracts.
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tries bordering with Sweden and other EU Member States, since in such a way 
electricity produced in Sweden was kept for domestic (Swedish) consumption 
and its export over Swedish borders was disabled 19.
Further, in its Preliminary Assessment of 25 June 2009 (hereinafter referred to 
as “Preliminary Assessment”) the Commission raised concerns that SvK may 
have abused its dominant position by treating requests for transmission for the 
purpose of consumption within Sweden differently from requests for transmis-
sion for the purpose of export, thereby discriminating between different net-
work users. In that way SvK may have artifi cially segmented the market and 
the Commission has not established an objective justifi cation for such conduct.
SvK did not agree with the Preliminary Assessment of the Commission and 
pointed out in its defense that SvK limited electricity exports to avoid internal 
congestion and bottlenecks in the Swedish transmission system managed by 
SvK, which ensures stable operation of the system.20
Describing the situation in the Swedish power system in the Preliminary As-
sessment, the Commission primarily pointed out that bottlenecks in Sweden 
are a result of unequal distribution of demand and supply for electricity on the 
Swedish territory. In fact, most of the Swedish electricity demand is located 
in the south of Sweden, while the generation facilities in the country are not 
distributed in the same way as consumption. Thus, the excess of electricity 
produced in the north of the country should be transferred to the south where 
the majority of consumption takes place.
Furthermore, the Commission, referring to the information made available, 
stated that the largest installed capacity for production of electricity in Sweden 
is provided from hydropower plants and nuclear plants, in total 25.3 GW of 
installed capacity i.e. 76% of total installed capacity for electricity production 
in Sweden. Electricity produced in that manner mostly supplies the demand 
for electricity in Sweden.
In addition, the Commission pointed out that the use of such technologies has 
lower marginal costs than thermal technologies and that in the periods when 
hydropower and nuclear power can serve all of demand in Sweden, the price in 
Sweden is directly infl uenced by lower marginal costs of electricity production 
19 See more in Sabolić, D.: “Tržišna alokacija prekograničnih prijenosnih kapaciteta, elek-
tronički prilog doktorskoj disertaciji “Ekonomska regulacija međuoperatorskog poravnanja 
i upravljanja zagušenjima na tržištu električne energije” (Market allocation of cross-border 
transmission capacity, electronic appendix to the doctoral thesis “Economic Regulation of the 
inter-operational settlement and congestion management in the electricity market), Sveučilište 
u Splitu, Ekonomski fakultet 2016.
20  Ibid.
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from hydropower and nuclear power plants. Consequently, the prices in Sweden 
are lower than those of other zones where demand can rarely be met only by 
such cheaply generated electricity. Such situation occurs in eastern and western 
Denmark, which area relies on cheap imported electricity. However, the demand 
of such produced electricity can rarely be met, which is why the use of more 
expensive thermal power plants, whose marginal costs are considerably higher 
than the use of hydro power and nuclear power plants, is required.
The Commission also concluded that the Swedish electricity network emerges 
congestions and bottlenecks not only due to the imbalance between supply and 
demand on the north and the south of Sweden, but also because in the north of 
Sweden cheap electricity is imported from Norway and on the south of Swe-
den electricity is exported to the area of the continental Europe. 21.
Further, the Commission stressed the fact that, in the long term, investments 
to expand or reinforce capacity in the network can primarily remedy the con-
gestion in the transmission grid. Without prejudice to the investment in the 
network, the Commission proposed three types of measures to relieve internal 
network congestion in the shorter term22, namely:
− to create separate price areas on both sides of the bottleneck and hence 
give price signals to increase production and decrease consumption in the 
higher-priced side of the bottleneck;
− to pay generators or large consumers on both sides of the bottleneck to 
change their planned production or consumption, which effectively reduces 
the transmission fl ow on the bottleneck;
− to limit available transmission capacity for trade with another zone in Sweden, 
to relieve the foreseen congestion on the bottleneck within Sweden’s network.
Through market mechanism, inter alia, congestions are managed by sending 
price signals to traders and other market participants about the availability 
of each individual limit for energy transmission through it. Keeping in mind 
that the limit at which the high rates of transmission capacity are consistently 
achieved is clearly congested, traders have a direct fi nancial stimulus to try to 
fi nd an alternative boundary (or more) over which they can transmit the energy 
21  See more in Sabolić, D.: “Tržišna alokacija prekograničnih prijenosnih kapaciteta, elek-
tronički prilog doktorskoj disertaciji “Ekonomska regulacija međuoperatorskog poravnanja 
i upravljanja zagušenjima na tržištu električne energije” (Market allocation of cross-border 
transmission capacity, electronic appendix to the doctoral thesis “Economic Regulation of the 
inter-operational settlement and congestion management in the electricity market) Sveučilište 
u Splitu, Ekonomski fakultet 2016., 
22  See more in Sadowska M., Willems B: Power Markets Shaped by Antitrust, Tilec Discus-
sion Paper Vol 2012-043, 2012, Tilburg.
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from its (agreed) source to its destination, thus relieving the pressure on the 
clearly congested border. 23
Additionally, according to the Commission’s Preliminary Assessment, SvK 
limited electricity exports, due to internal bottlenecks, on several intercon-
nectors in the Swedish transmission grid from January 2002 to April 2008. In 
relation to this, the Commission emphasized that SvK limited the transmission 
capacity on the interconnectors, among others, towards Denmark and Poland, 
while SvK almost never limited the interconnectors’ export capacity towards 
central and northern Norway. 24.
Furthermore, the proportion of the capacity curtailed by SvK due to internal 
congestion has on average exceeded half of the overall interconnector capacity 
on all interconnectors in most years within the investigated period. In hours 
when capacity limitation and congestion on the interconnectors have occurred 
due to the behavior of SvK in Sweden, the average prices in the neighboring 
countries were signifi cantly higher than the prices in Sweden. The Commis-
sion therefore concluded that the prices in Sweden’s neighboring countries 
would have been lower if there were not any limitations of export capacities.
In relation to the proceedings described herein, the Commission announced in 
its report for the press of 6 October 2009 that it considers the respective case 
as contribution to strengthening the integration of the internal market of the 
European Union25, with the aim of increasing the competitiveness leading to 
lower prices and higher quality of provided services as well as improvements 
in the security of suffi cient electricity supply.
2.3. COMMITMENTS OF COMPANY SVENSKA KRAFTNAT
In accordance with Regulation 1/2003 the company SvK, although it objected 
Commissions allegations from the Preliminary Assessment, offered to meet 
certain obligations undertaking to remedy the potential negative effects of its 
23  Sabolić, D.: “Tržišna alokacija prekograničnih prijenosnih kapaciteta, elektronički prilog 
doktorskoj disertaciji “Ekonomska regulacija međuoperatorskog poravnanja i upravljanja 
zagušenjima na tržištu električne energije” (Market allocation of cross-border transmission 
capacity, electronic appendix to the doctoral thesis “Economic Regulation of the inter-opera-
tional settlement and congestion management in the electricity market), Sveučilište u Splitu, 
Ekonomski fakultet 2016. 
24  Ibid
25  See more in Bodiroga-Vukobrat, N., Horak, H., Martinović, A.: Temeljne gospodarske slo-
bode u Europskoj uniji (Fundamental economic freedoms in the European Union), Inženjerski 
biro, Zagreb, 2011.
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actions stated in the Preliminary Assessment of the Commission26 (hereinaf-
ter referred to as “Commitments from September 2009”). SvK subsequently 
supplemented the Commitments from September 2009 and provided the fi nal 
commitments to the Commission from 26 January 2010 (hereinafter referred 
to as “Final Commitments”).
Pursuant to the Commitments from September 2009, SvK offered a commit-
ment to subdivide the Swedish transmission system into two or more bidding 
zones where it is possible to geographically determine different market prices. 
SvK committed to operate the Swedish transmission system by subdividing it 
into the abovementioned bidding zones by 1 July 2011 at the latest.
In doing so, the confi guration of the bidding zones would be fl exible enough 
so that the Swedish transmission system can quickly be modifi ed to adapt to 
foreseen and unforeseen changes in the future fl ow patterns on the transmis-
sion system. From the date the bidding zones are operative, SvK intended to 
manage congestions (conditions in which the transmission capacity of the 
transmission system on some of its parts is not suffi cient to cover the demand 
for transmission) in the Swedish transmission system without limiting trading 
capacity on interconnectors 27.
It is important to emphasize that SvK excluded the area in the West-Coast-Cor-
ridor of Sweden from the bidding zones due to technical reasons. SvK com-
mitted to reinforce the West-Coast-Corridor section by building and operating 
a new 400 kV transmission line between Stenkullen and Strömma-Lindome 
by 30 November 201128.
SvK proposed to implement Commitments from September 2009 10 years 
from the date on which the Commission will decide on the acceptance of those 
commitments and fi le reports to the Commission every three months at the 
beginning and annually after putting the bidding zones into operation.
26  In Article 9. Regulation 1/2003 undertakings were given a possibility to offer commit-
ments to meet concerns expressed to them by the Commission in its preliminary assessment. 
If the Commission accepts the proposed commitments offered by undertakings, its decision 
obliges undertakings to adopt these commitments which will eliminate the negative effects of 
the undertakings conduct from the preliminary assessment of the Commission and determines 
that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission.
27  See more in Sabolić, D.: “Tržišna alokacija prekograničnih prijenosnih kapaciteta, elek-
tronički prilog doktorskoj disertaciji “Ekonomska regulacija međuoperatorskog poravnanja 
i upravljanja zagušenjima na tržištu električne energije” (Market allocation of cross-border 
transmission capacity, electronic appendix to the doctoral thesis “Economic Regulation of the 
inter-operational settlement and congestion management in the electricity market), Sveučilište 
u Splitu, Ekonomski fakultet 2016.
28  Ibid.
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2.4. INTERESTED THIRD PARTY OBSERVATIONS
Pursuant to Article 27 of Resolution 1/2003, the Commission published a short 
summary of the proceedings opened against SvK in the Offi cial Journal of the 
European Union C 239/9 of 6 October 2009, as well as the basic content of 
the Commitments from September 2009, which document served as a public 
notice to all the interested third parties to submit their comments and obser-
vations on the Commitments from September 2009 (hereinafter referred to as 
“Public notice”). 
All interested third parties were invited to provide the Commission with their 
comments and observations on the proposed commitments to SvK within one 
month from the date of publication of the Public notice in the Offi cial Journal 
of the European Union. The Commission also specifi cally invited the inter-
ested third parties to give their observations on the SvK commitments with 
respect to excluding the area in the West-Coast-Corridor of Sweden from the 
bidding zones. 29
In response to the Public notice, the Commission received 27 responses from 
interested third parties. In order to analyze the respective case it is of impor-
tance to mention the most important observations from the interested third 
parties along with Commission’s statement on certain responses, highlighted 
in the Commission’s decision of 14 April 2010, as follows:
1. Observation on the adequacy of bidding zones as a remedy to tackle inter-
nal congestion in Sweden’s transmission system.
Some respondents argued that the bidding zones are not the right remedy to 
tackle internal congestion in the Swedish transmission system and that net-
work investments and counter-trade would better solve the competition con-
cerns identifi ed in the Commission’s Preliminary Assessment. 
As subdividing the Swedish transmission system into two or more bidding 
zones was the principal commitment proposed by SvK, the Commission held 
the proposed commitment suffi cient and proportionate to eliminate the above-
mentioned concerns, as explained below.
2. Observation on the impact of bidding zones on concentration and prices in 
Sweden.
Certain respondents argued that the introduction of bidding zones would 
lead to increased concentration on retail, wholesale and balancing markets in 
29  See more in Sadowska M., Willems B: Power Markets Shaped by Antitrust, Tilec Discus-
sion Paper Vol 2012-043, 2012, Tilburg.
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Sweden. In addition, some respondents pointed to potentially higher prices in 
southern Sweden, due to introduction of bidding zones.
After reviewing the respective comments on the Public notice from the inter-
ested third parties, the Commission took the view that neither the comments 
on concentration nor the comments on higher prices require a modifi cation of 
Commitments from September 2009 by SvK, due to the fact that concentration 
in electricity markets is a result of physical factors (such as network topology 
and location of production and demand in the network). Furthermore, since 
the concentration existed before the introduction of bidding zones, they do not 
have an impact on the occurrence and increase of such concentration30.
In addition to the above, some respondents argued that the complexities of 
zones will create additional costs and risks for retailers which will deter entry 
in retail markets, thereby leading to more concentration on retail markets than 
currently. In this respect, the Commission emphasized it is correct that the 
subdivision into bidding zones will affect market conditions and, consequent-
ly, the risk policy of market participants31.
The Commission further notes that introduction of bidding zones will pre-
vent a distortion of price signals and refl ect real market conditions (prices will 
increase in the zones where there is a defi cit of cheap generation or in zones 
where consumption is signifi cant and vice versa). These price signals will give 
clearer indications to investors on the most relevant places to build new gen-
eration capacities32.
30  During the investigation, the Commission concluded that in countries where several bid-
ding zones are operated by transmission system operator, the retail markets remain compet-
itive and that it is therefore clear that bidding zones, in themselves, are not an obstacle to 
competition. The Commission also emphasized that it was found in a survey carried out by the 
Nordic Council of Ministers in 2008 that the introduction of bidding zones in Sweden would 
be positive for the European consumers and should pave the way for more transparent energy 
markets for fi nal customers in Sweden, and in the Union.
31  The Commission emphasized that the market participants dispose with instruments such as 
Contracts for Differences (“CfD contracts”) to manage the risk in the short term. In addition and in 
the longer term, market participants may invest in new generation capacities so that they are able to 
meet the demand of customers that are located in zones where generation capacities are scarce.
32  Some respondents complained that prices will increase due to the new system of zones. 
First, to the extent that one can anticipate how prices will change after subdivision, prices will 
likely not increase in all future bidding zones in Sweden. It is therefore likely in the near future 
that in northern Sweden, electricity prices will decrease due to excess of cheap hydro genera-
tion and lack of suffi cient transmission capacity between north and south. In southern Sweden, 
prices will likely increase in the near future due to insuffi cient amount of cheap generation 
assets in that area and the lack of transmission capacity from northern Sweden. This is a nec-
essary consequence of the remedy which puts an end to the alleged discrimination between 
Swedish and non-Swedish customers which is not compatible with Article 102 TFEU.
63
N. Perić: The case against the Swedish transmission system operator (TSO) Svenska Kraftnat for abuse of a dominat...
Some consumers in south Sweden complained that the introduction of bidding 
zones will affect the prices for the industry in south Sweden and that will 
affect their ability to compete in their own markets. Commission respond-
ed to the complaints of consumers in south Sweden that the introduction of 
bidding zones will affect the prices for the industry in south Sweden and that 
will affect their ability to compete in their own markets explaining that other 
European industrial customers outside Sweden faced unfair competition from 
Swedish industrial customers that were paying for their electricity at prices 
which do not refl ect market conditions. The Commission also stated that bid-
ding zones will result in prices refl ecting true market conditions.
3. Observation on the deadline of introduction of bidding zones.
Some respondents to the Commission’s Public notice argued that the intro-
duction of bidding zones as early as from 1 July 2011 would jeopardize some 
of the fi nancial and long-term supply contracts that have already been signed. 
Some energy suppliers and traders signed CfD contracts traded on Nord Pool 
ASA, European stock exchange for electrical energy which fi nancial contracts 
expired in 2012. According to those market players, an early introduction of 
the bidding zones would change the value of the abovementioned fi nancial 
contracts and result in some of them incurring losses. In addition, other re-
spondents objected the introduction of bidding zones from 1 July 2011 due 
to the fact that they signed fi xed-price long-term supply contracts with fi nal 
customers.
The Commission took the view that the above stated arguments do not justify 
the delay of introduction of the bidding zones explaining that fi nancial con-
tracts bear risk factors and that indications that the bidding zones would be 
implemented in Sweden existed at the time of entering into those contracts, 
which introduction is one of many risks market players are exposed to33.
4. Observation on the impact of bidding zones on new investment projects on 
renewable energies.
Some respondents argued that the introduction of bidding zones will reduce 
the incentives to build more generation based on renewable energy in Swedish 
territory. They underlined the fact that the largest potential to invest in re-
newable energy is located in northern Sweden. As the introduction of bidding 
zones may prompt a decrease in prices in northern Sweden, some respondents 
found it was likely that some investment projects to build more renewable in 
33  See more in Sadowska M., Willems B: Power Markets Shaped by Antitrust, Tilec Discus-
sion Paper Vol 2012-043, 2012, Tilburg.
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northern Sweden would not be profi table any longer and would be given up. 
As a consequence, market players were fearing that the objective to reach an 
ambitious share of renewable energy in the overall electricity generation in 
Sweden for 2020, as laid out in Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of 
energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Di-
rectives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (Offi cial Journal of the European Union, 
L 140/16 of 05 June 2009), may not be achieved.
The Commission emphasized, in response to the abovementioned argument, 
that the network in Sweden in this stage is not able to transport at all times all 
electricity from the north to the south of Sweden, where the electricity is es-
sentially consumed. Therefore, adding more renewable generation in the north 
would simply increase the already existing bottlenecks in Sweden and new 
renewable generation could not be transmitted to the south where most of the 
electricity is consumed. Also, as electricity cannot be stored in large scale, in-
vesting in more renewable generation in the north cannot effectively contribute 
to a larger proportion of renewable generated electricity.34 The Commission 
also noted that Sweden has a green certifi cate scheme aimed at promoting 
renewable energy sources which is independent from bidding zones.
5. Observation on the measures foreseen in the interim period until the bid-
ding zones become operative.
In the interim period until the bidding zones become operative, SvK proposed 
it will introduce an increased use of counter-trade as a measure that will lim-
it curtailments until the bidding zones are operative. In this regard, some of 
the interested parties expressed concern that the proposed measures were not 
clearly explained. Furthermore, they criticized that only resources in Sweden 
(production unit or unit of consumption that can increase or reduce energy or 
electricity production in the short term) and no foreign resources for count-
er-trade were considered. In accordance with aforementioned, SvK modifi ed 
its Commitments from September 2009 with a revised proposal submitted in 
the Final Commitments in which SvK clarifi ed the counter-trade procedure 
and included non-Swedish resources for counter-trade, under certain condi-
tions.
34  See more in Sabolić, D.: “Tržišna alokacija prekograničnih prijenosnih kapaciteta, elek-
tronički prilog doktorskoj disertaciji “Ekonomska regulacija međuoperatorskog poravnanja 
i upravljanja zagušenjima na tržištu električne energije” (Market allocation of cross-border 
transmission capacity, electronic appendix to the doctoral thesis “Economic Regulation of the 
inter-operational settlement and congestion management in the electricity market), Sveučilište 
u Splitu, Ekonomski fakultet 2016. 
65
N. Perić: The case against the Swedish transmission system operator (TSO) Svenska Kraftnat for abuse of a dominat...
As stated below, after the submission of responses to the Public notice, SvK 
supplemented the Commitments from September 2009 and provided the Fi-
nal commitments to the Commission from 26 January 2010 in which SvK 
extended the implementation period for the introduction of bidding zones in 
the Swedish transmission system until 1 November 2011, specifi ed the count-
er-trade procedure and included non-Swedish resources for counter-trade (pro-
duction units or units of consumption that can increase or reduce energy or 
electricity production in the short term).
2.5. THE DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
The Commission rendered a Decision on 14 April 2010 which obliges SvK to 
comply with the obligations from the Final Commitments and which, at the 
same time, terminates the proceedings opened against company SvK (herein-
after referred to as “Commission’s Decision”).
The proceedings against SvK were terminated by the Decision in accordance 
with the Article 9 of the Regulation 1/2003, since there were no longer grounds 
for action on Commission’s part taking into consideration that the Final Com-
mitments are suffi cient to meet the concerns based on the Preliminary Assess-
ment and eliminate the negative effects of SvK’s conduct.
Taking into account the market situation and the measures that had been avail-
able to the Commission it is interesting how the Commission grounded its 
decision in this, technically very complex case35.
In particular, explaining the suitability of measures that SvK obliged to imple-
ment in the Final Commitments in order to eliminate the negative effects from 
the Preliminary Assessment, the Commission stated that the abovementioned 
obligations of SvK are appropriate to address the concerns from the Prelimi-
nary Assessment and are in accordance with the principle of proportionality. 
36 As is well known, the principle of proportionality as one of the fundamen-
tal principles of the European Union obliges the EU institutions to maintain 
proportionality between the objectives to be achieved and the means used to 
achieve such objectives. Also, the principle of proportionality requires that 
when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be 
had to the least onerous one for the included obligor.
35  See more in Sadowska M., Willems B: Power Markets Shaped by Antitrust, Tilec Discus-
sion Paper Vol 2012-043, 2012, Tilburg.
36  See more about the principle of proportionality in Šoljan V.; Vladajući položaj na tržištu i 
njegova zlouporaba u pravu tržišnog natjecanja Europske zajednice (Abuse of Dominant Position 
on the Market in the European Community Competition Law); Ibis grafi ka d.o.o. Zagreb, 2004.
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In relation to the abovementioned, the Commission also concluded that the 
exclusion of the West Coast Corridor from the commitments of bidding zones 
and counter-trade is a proportionate measure due to the technical reasons and 
that imposing such measures to SvK would not be in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality since the isolated topology of the West Coast Cor-
ridor contains insuffi cient fl exible generation units that can provide electrical 
energy.
The Commission also emphasized that investment in the network can also 
be one of the measures to mitigate the problem of congestion in the Swed-
ish national transmission system. However, while rendering the Commission’s 
Decision, the Commission took into account that investments in the network 
require long leading times to be implemented (often more than ten years), and 
the outcome cannot be guaranteed because SvK cannot control all factors af-
fecting the implementation of new networks.37 Without prejudice to the above-
mentioned, the Commission pointed out that introduction of bidding zones 
and counter-trade do not prevent SvK from investing in new lines in Swedish 
transmission system.
Furthermore, the Commission concluded that SvK will not need to curtail 
capacity on the interconnectors on Swedish borders due to congestion in the 
transmission system after the introduction of two or more bidding zones. Par-
ticularly, the borders between zones will correspond to bottlenecks in the net-
work, and the bidding zones will be separate markets in which consumers and 
generators will submit day-ahead bids indicating what they want to consume 
or produce in that bidding zone. The capacity on the links between the bidding 
zones will be made fully available to the market and the market will organize 
and automatically adjust through mechanisms which ensure suffi cient trans-
mission capacity.
With respect to the abovementioned, if congestion occurs on the links between 
two zones, the market-clearing mechanism, according to Commission, will 
automatically adjust the amounts of supply and demand cleared in each zone 
and set different prices for the two zones so that the amount of electricity 
transmitted between the zones is equal to the capacity between the zones. In 
this way, the market-clearing mechanism will eliminate the congestion. As a 
37  In its Decision the Commission stated, based on the principle of proportionality that the 
congestion in the West Coast Corridor will be alleviated through the only measure available 
to SvK, which is the building of the new 400 kV transmission line between Stenkullen and 
Strömma-Lindome by 30 November 2011.The Commission also emphasized that such measure 
is proportional having in consideration that imposing SvK commitments to introduce bidding 
zones or counter-trade in that area would be disproportionate due to technical condition of the 
electricity system in the corridor of the West Coast.
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consequence, SvK will no longer need to curtail capacity on the interconnec-
tors to other countries. Also, SvK will not need to curtail capacity due to con-
gestion within zones because it will be able to carry out counter-trade within 
the zones to address such congestion.
In the Commission Decision, the Commission also addressed SvK’s complaint 
that it cannot be considered as an undertaking within the meaning of Arti-
cle 102 TFEU, since it is part of the state administration of the Kingdom of 
Sweden and does not have a legal personality. In this regard, the Commission 
concluded that SvK is within the scope of norm of the Article 102 TFEU, since 
it is engaged in economic activities as it provides its services on the electricity 
transmission market and is therefore considered to be an undertaking within 
the meaning of 102 Article TFEU. The Commission stated that the fact that 
SvK does not have a separate legal personality from that of the Kingdom of 
Sweden does not affect the conclusion that it is considered an undertaking 
within the meaning of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and emphasized that SvK, 
in matters of its competence, has a separate legal capacity38.
3. CONCLUSION
This case has shown how various measures set out by the Commission (divi-
sion into several zones, additional investment, counter-trade) may affect the 
prevention of discrimination against foreign generators and consumers of elec-
tricity in relation to domestic ones. In this manner, a greater integration of the 
energy market in the Nordic countries and the internal market is achieved.
The case has also demonstrated the position of the Commission according to 
which a mere fact that the undertaking has a great market power and a domi-
nant position does not by itself represent a violation of competition rules: But 
in that case a regulator and the court practice are of the opinion that such an 
undertaking should have a special responsibility39.
38  See more in Sadowska M., Willems B: Power Markets Shaped by Antitrust, Tilec Discus-
sion Paper Vol 2012-043, 2012, Tilburg.
39  Signifi cant consequences of the term “abuse” by applying the criteria of so called specifi c 
responsibility are evident in determining responsibility for insuffi cient effi ciency in business 
management, and the use and development of production capacity and modern technology in 
cases Lucezeau v SACEM and Porto di Genova, computer manufacturer IBM obligation to 
promptly make available to its competitors all the necessary technical information necessary 
for the development of hardware and software compatible product upgrades - see more in Šol-
jan V.; Vladajući položaj na tržištu i njegova zlouporaba u pravu tržišnog natjecanja Europske 
zajednice (Abuse of Dominant Position on the Market in the European Community Competi-
tion Law); Ibis grafi ka d.o.o. Zagreb, 2004.
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It is to be considered that undertaking have a dominant position when it has 
the ability to signifi cantly close the access to the market to other undertakings, 
or the ability to determine the conditions under which it will develop market 
competition with competitors in horizontal market position. Typical forms of 
closing of the related markets are the performance of related business, rejection 
of business operations and deny of access to “necessary means”, while preven-
tion of maintenance and development of market competition with competitors in 
horizontal market position can be manifested in the effects of implementation 
of agreement on the exclusive business and rejection of business operations in 
situations where a specifi c form of cooperation with a competitor is required so 
that a rival with a weaker position in the market could compete effectively.
Implementation of measures such as dividing the market into several zones 
and/or obliging the undertakings with a dominant position to make certain in-
vestments in infrastructure can stimulate a better integration of the market and 
its liberalization, which leads to a greater protection of consumer’s interests, 
since ultimately they profi t the most, because they have an ability to choose 
between different providers and lower prices of services. This method stim-
ulates the development and integration of the European market, with the aim 
of optimal protection of the consumers whose interests are in the focus of the 
relevant bodies of the European Union.
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